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ABSTRACT
Cheng, Ping-Ying. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2010. Detecting
Cartels: Price Rigidity and the Application of the ICSS Algorithm. Major Professor: Julia
A. Heath, Ph.D.
This paper proposes that the Iterative Cumulative Sums of Squares (ICSS)
Algorithm can be applied to help better detect periods of collusive behavior in markets by
analyzing changes in the variance of product prices over time. Price rigidity is a common
characteristic of oligopolies and has been theoretically proven in many studies. The
kinked-demand-curve explains that firms would prefer to stay at the agreed upon
monopoly price rather than cutting prices to earn more market share during a single
period. An infinitely repeated Bertrand game model developed by Athey, Bagwell, and
Sanchirico (2004) claims that if the firms are sufficiently patient, the optimal symmetric
collusive scheme can be reached when the equilibrium-path price wars are absent and the
price is rigid. Harrington and Chen (2006)’s dynamic programming framework
established an optimal cartel price path which has a transition phase and a stationary
phase. The stationary phase shows that price in collusive regime is much less volatile
than price in competitive regime.
In order to detect the existence of cartel, this paper employs the ICSS algorithm
developed by Inclan and Tiao (1994) to detect multiple changes of variance in a given
time series. The flat glass antitrust litigation in early 1990s was detected by this technique
and had the results that periods of December 1982 to June 1984 and November 1987 to
February 1990, with the lower variance relative to the periods before and after were
defined as suspected collusion periods. By applying the model for damage analysis, the
price of flat glass was confirmed to be overcharged by the producers during the
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conspiracy periods detected by the ICSS algorithm rather than the class periods certified
by the court.
The steel industry in the 1920s and 1930s had market power in agreeing on pricefixing. This industry was analyzed using the ICSS algorithm and found relatively smaller
steel price variance for the periods of August 1924 to November 1931 and June 1938 to
December 1939. The damage analysis has shown that customers for steel products were
overcharged by steel producers during these periods rather than the periods in the
literature.
Based on empirical results, the ICSS algorithm provides a fast and simple method
of detecting the existence of cartels and collusive behavior. This is the first study to apply
the ICSS algorithm in forensic economics to detection of this behavior and appears to be
successful in detecting periods of anticompetitive behavior. In the future, it might provide
an alternative method to more easily discover and prosecute anticompetitive behavior.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A cartel is group of firms brought together with intent to collude and obtain profit
which would otherwise not be available. Bian (1959) defines collusion as, “implying . . .
that the rival sellers in some manner arrive at an understanding as to what price to charge
or what outputs to produce, or both.” The goal of firms forming cartels is to limit
competition and thus increase firms’ profits. Firms’ jointly maximized profits level could
be reached by restricting output and increasing price. Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act states, “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States…shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” Under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, cartel behavior in the United States is illegal; therefore,
government agencies make the effort to detect, prosecute, and penalize these practices.
This paper proposes that the Iterative Cumulative Sums of Squares (ICSS) algorithm can
be applied to help better detect periods of collusive behavior in markets by analyzing
changes in the variance of product prices over time.
Firms within an industry often have the temptation to meet in an attempt to fix
prices and restrict output; these attempts have varying degrees of success. This is a
problem which has come to the forefront in recent years, with early economists also
discussing firms’ attempts to attain monopoly profits. Adam Smith (1776) once remarked,
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices.” These temptations would leave firms immune from severe competition and result
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in cooperative relations with their rivals. Because of the various strategic concerns in
maintaining a cartel, immediate issues which firms face are coordination, cheating, and
market entry. Some cartels work well for firms fixing their prices and last for a long
period of time. Some cartels collapse in a very short of time and have little or no effect on
purchasers or industry structure. Others have successfully fixed prices for certain periods
and then the cartel fell apart due to new innovations, new entries, or other non-price
related competition. Following Stigler (1964), it is a well-established proposition that if
any firm in a cartel can secretly cut its price below the agreement but remain above
marginal cost, it will gain larger profits than by complying with the agreement. Many
economists have argued this ability to cut prices below agreed upon levels to increase
profit will lead to the collapse of a cartel. Subsequent literature established the theoretical
work that cheating could be deterred, and a cartel could form and survive for periods
when firms are patient and well-informed.
The majority of theoretical collusion literature discusses the game theoretic
concerns of cheating and its prevention. In Stigler’s (1964) study, he emphasized that the
incentive to cheat is the most important reason for the instability undermining attempts to
collude. Unlike a one shot game, if firms have repeated interactions, this continuous
interaction theoretically can provide the incentive of future collusive profit and thus deter
firms from cheating. Most of the literature has theoretically claimed that firms’ repeated
interaction over time supports collusion. Benoit and Krishna’s (1985) article provides a
theoretical basis for the argument that firms’ repeated interaction across space or markets
may also support collusion. Since the interaction between firms is over time, firms
determine continuing or deviating from the collusive behavior by weighting the expected
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benefit from cheating today with the expected cost of cheating; this expected cost is the
reduction of future discounted profit due to cheating. If the cost of cheating is higher than
the benefit, firms will stay in the collusive agreement and refrain from undercutting the
collusive price.
Cheating is a major problem of cartel not only at the time of formation but also
during the collusive period. Stigler (1964) argues that cartels are fundamentally unstable.
His argument is based on the concept that firms agree to restrict output, but then engage
in secret cheating to individually increase profit that induces price wars. Firms may try to
collude again after price wars occur, but the incentive to gain profit by increasing
production at the price level above marginal cost would remain so great that the cartel
could not last. The action of the cartel’s breaking down and re-forming causes
fluctuations in market price for that product. Many modern economists have accepted
Stigler’s thought that cheating is the major threat which causes the instability of cartels,
but these economists derive completely different results from collusion. For example,
Green and Porter (1984) argue that a price war is not the result of cheating, but actually
the solution to deter cheating. Since a price war is costly, firms refrain from cheating in
order to prevent its occurrence. Unless a cartel has a formal organization and a perfect
monitoring system, firms are unable to determine if changes in market price are due to a
change of demand or some member’s secretly lowering prices. As a result, firms arguably
respond to this change in market prices with price wars, effectively undermining their
profit advantage.
The most common way to identify a cartel’s attempt to monopolize a market and
the timing of the cartel’s conspiracy period is through physical evidence, such as
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documents regarding planned coordinated price announcements, perhaps attained from
employee witnesses or “whistleblowers.” Suslow (2005) defines distinct cartel episodes
as occurring within an industry if the cartel contract was restructured due to the exit of a
key member or the entry of a significant new member. Suslow’s methods show that the
duration of a cartel may be shorter than a cartel contract, and cartels may dissolve and
reform later. Eckbo (1976) defines cartel success or “efficiency” in terms of the ability to
raise prices 200% above the unit costs of production and distribution. He reviewed 51
significant international cartel organizations. Only 19 of these cartels were “efficient,”
although these cartels did not last very long. Those lasting for four years or more were
those industries with high concentration of production, inelastic demand, high cartel
market share, member cost advantage, and with no government intervention.
With the conspiracy period defined, one can determine the economic effect
arising from the cartel by comparing the prices and profits within the conspiracy period
with those that would have resulted without the conspiracy. However, physical evidence
may be unsatisfactory when trying to identify the true timing of a cartel’s negative
economic impact. As the literature previous discussed shows, attempts to collude may
initially fail, or perhaps fail altogether (due to the incentives to cheat, for example).
However, even when the cartel’s attempt to collude is successful, there is almost always
some delay between the cartel’s initial attempts to coordinate its conduct (i.e., the
conspiracy period) and the successful cartel’s sustained effect on price (i.e., the damage
period).
Because it is difficult to analyze damages outside of the conspiracy period (as
officially designated in an allegation against a cartel), analyses that account for the
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aforementioned “delayed effect” are rarely attempted. This is a shortcoming in the
applied practice of damage estimation since empirical and theoretical literature supports
the idea of a delayed effect. Some cartel studies report that the coordinated price really
starts to take effect a few months after the creation of the cartel; other cartel studies report
that the coordinated price begins with the creation of the cartel, but the coordinated price
increase does not reach joint profit-maximizing levels.
There are two approaches to discover cartels. One approach is structural and the
other is behavioral. The structural approach includes identifying the characteristics which
are thought to be conducive to collusion. For example, an industry characterized by fewer
firms, more homogenous products, and stable demand has a higher propensity to form a
cartel. The behavioral approach, unlike the structural approach, entails either observing
the means with which the firms use to coordinate their behavior, or observing the result
attributable to the coordination of firms. The means with which the firms coordinate their
behavior is often a type of direct communication (i.e., memos). In many cases, cartels
have been detected by evidence of such communication. Besides observing the means of
coordination, the behavioral approach may also involve observing the market impact of
that coordination. Suspicions may arise from the pattern of firms’ prices, quantities, or
some other aspect of market behavior. A parallel movement in prices among producers or
an unexplainable increase in prices may make purchasers become suspicious of cartel
behavior. Beside these two unusual prices movements, the more stable price movements
over time also signal suspicion of the existence of a cartel. This sign is even more
practical in detecting the collusion during an economic recession. Instead of firms lowing
prices during recessions, a cartel fixes the prices to minimized lower profit expectations
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due to the bad economy. The main issue in this paper is whether there is some kind of
testing methodology which can successfully identify the timing and duration of collusive
behavior.
This paper focuses on observing the impact on the market price attributable to
cartel conspiracies among firms. Many studies have theoretically or empirically shown
that the price variance changes during the conspiracy period. Therefore, based on data
analysis, once the variance “change point” in time series price data is found (without a
commensurate variance change in costs), it could mark the beginning or the ending of the
conspiracy period.
A paper by Abrantes-Metz, Froeb, Geweke, and Taylor (2006) studies the price
movement over time to compare the variance of prices between conspiracy and
competitive periods. In the Abrantes-Metz et al. paper, the industry of interest was
prosecuted by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice for rigging the
bids to supply seafood to military installations. The authors collected data from the time
period around the cartel’s collapse to estimate price variance across the collapse of the
bid-rigging conspiracy. Both prices and costs were compared between the “collusive”
and “competitive” regimes. Figure 1 shows their comparison of prices and costs in the
“collusive” regime, which is the left of the vertical line, and prices in the “competitive”
regime, which is the right of the vertical line; the period between those two vertical lines
is the transition from collusion to competition. They found that the mean price decreased
by 16%, and the standard deviation increased by 263% after the collapse of collusion.
Hence, they concluded that the conspiracy had the impact not only on increasing the price
level, but also on decreasing the price variance.
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Figure 1. Collusion and the Variance of Frozen Perch Prices and Costs: 1/6/87-9/26/89
Source: Abrantes-Metz, Froeb, Geweke, and Taylor (2006)

This paper attempts to find the variance change point in time series price data to
detect a cartel’s damage period. Inclan and Tiao (1994) propose a general procedure to
detect variance change points based on the Iterative Cumulative Sums of Squares (ICSS)
algorithm. In their study, the main issue is detecting multiple variance change points
within a given time series. By studying the centered cumulative sum of squares, the
authors provide an intuitive basis for the ICSS algorithm. Inclan and Tiao claim the
results of ICSS are very comparable to those results from the Bayesian approach and
from the likelihood ratio test when the series are of a moderate size. Moreover, unlike the
latter two approaches, the ICSS algorithm does not require a heavy computational burden.
The ICSS algorithm has been applied in many studies within finance literature. A more
in-depth literature review on studies which applied ICSS method will be discussed in the
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Chapter 3. This paper is the first paper to apply the ICSS algorithm in forensic economics.
Hence, the main issue in this paper is to apply the ICSS algorithm in detecting the
changing points of variance of prices in markets where collusive behavior has occurred to
help determine the beginning and ending of the conspiracy period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a
literature review of price rigidity in collusion theory including a repeated game model
and a dynamic collusion pricing model; Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the ICSS
algorithm methodology and its applications; Chapter 4 applies the ICSS algorithm to
detect the duration of two cartels: the flat glass and steel in separate industries. Chapter 5
provides a conclusion and discussion.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Price Rigidity in Collusion Theory
A Kink-Demand-Curve Example
One common characteristic in markets exhibiting collusive behavior is price
rigidity. Firms cannot adjust prices continuously. One reason is that it is costly for firms
to do that; however, another reason is that any price reaction of firms to others’ changes
brings in the issue of regaining or consolidating market share. A simple formalization of
short-run price rigidities and reaction is from Maskin and Tirole’s (1988) study that
assumes that firms do not choose their prices simultaneously. Two firms produce a
homogenous good. Firm 1 chooses its price at odd periods (2k+1), and Firm 2 chooses at
even periods (2k). Due to the assumption that firms can not adjust price quickly, the price
chosen by firm i would last for two periods:
,

,

;

,

,

;…

To maximize the present value of its profit, the objective function of firm i is
∑
where

,

,

,

.

is the profit fuction of firm , and

2.1
is the discount rate at period .

A perfect equilibrium would show that a firm’s price choice simply depends only
on the information related to its payoff. Firm 1’s profit at the time 2k+1 is affected by the
price from Firm 2, p2,2k+1. This is what called payoff-relevant. Based on the assumption in
this model, Firm 2 charges the same price in the period 2k+1 as the price in the period 2k.
Hence, the price that Firm 1 charges at 2k+1 is the reaction toward Firm 2’s price at 2k;
that is,

,

,

. In this model, a firm’s strategy is conditioned on little

information (the observed rival’s price). This information is so little that a firm’s strategy
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is constant with rationality. Firm 2 acts in the similar way,

,

. Both

,

Firm 1 and Firm 2’s reaction function are called Markov reaction functions. When firms
use Markov strategies1 to reach a perfect equilibrium, that equilibrium is a Markov
perfect equilibrium.
Firm 1’s reaction at time 2k+1 by observing Firm 2’s price at 2k is to maximize
its objective function with the expectation of the firms’ reactions: R1 (.) and R2 (.). Firm
1’s inter-temporal profit function at time 2k+1 is
max

,

,

,

.
Here

and

2.2
in the first term in the bracket represent Firm 1 and Firm 2’s prices

at time 2k+1, respectively; however, the price Firm 2 charges at this period is the same as
at time 2k. In the next period, Firm 1 will keep price at
Firm 1 then will react to

by charging its price at

with Firm 2’s reaction

.

in the following two

periods, and so on. As a result, , in the equilibrium, the price Firm 1 charges at 2k+1
based on the reaction to Firm 2’s price at 2k is to maximize the whole value in the
brackets for all

. Firm 2 behaves similarly to maximize its inter-temporal profit.

A kinked-demand-curve example is presented here. The kinked-demand-curve is
an “imagined demand curve” in a producer’s mind. If he raises his price, he must expect
to lose business to his rival, which implies that his demand curve tend to be elastic going
up, while if he reduces his price he will not expect to gain customers from his rival due to
retaliations; this action implies that his demand curve tends to be inelastic going down.

1

A player playing a Markov strategy, conditions his action of a period t only at his state
at this given period.
10

As a result, a producer’s imagined demand curve has a “kink” at the current price (Hall
and Hitch 1939; Sweezy 1939). It is assumed, for simplicity, that each firm has a demand
1

curve

and its cost is zero. A discrete price grid is used in this example:
⁄6,

0,1, … 6.

2.3

Since competitive price is the price that firms charge at marginal cost level, the
competitive price here is

; meanwhile, the monopoly price is the price firms charge

when marginal revenue equals demand,
function, where

.

.

1⁄2. Table 1 shows this symmetric reaction

. , with a discount factor sufficiently close to 1. The

first column is the current price charged by a firm, and the next column is the reaction
from its rival. The value in the right column is the profit when firms charge p. For
example, when

2⁄3 is charged, the quantity of demand will be 1/3 and the profit

will be 2/9.

Table 1
A Kinked-Demand-Curve Example
P

R p

π p

p6
p5
p4
p3
p2

p3
p3
p3
p3
p1
p3 with probability α
p1 with probability 1‐α
p3

0
5/36
8/36
9/36
8/36
5/36

p1
p0

0

Note. α depends on δ.
Source: Tirole (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization.

The price at the steady state, where both firms charge the same price, is the
monopoly price,

. If a firm increases its price to be above the monopoly price, its rival
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would not follow it but stay at
if a firm cut down its price to
price at

will be

due to the higher profit (9/36 > 8/36). On the contrary,
, a price war will occur. The reaction of its rival on the

. During the price war, firms would prefer returning to the price at

the steady state, the monopoly price. Nevertheless, no firm wants to raise its price first
because it would lose its market share in the short run.
In the above example, if firms are at the steady state (charging price at

), no

firm would deviate from that state. Firm 1’s inter-temporal profit is the sum of current
and future discounted profit:
1
8

1

1

1
8

2.4

Firm 1 can earn a profit of 2/9 today by gaining the whole market rather than a profit of
1/8 by sharing the market with Firm 2 if it cuts its current price to

. However, this

action of Firm 1 causes its rival to cut down the price, and thus Firm 1 will receive zero
profit in the next period. Firm 1 cannot adjust its price until the period after the next
period. However, even though Firm1 could adjust its price back to the monopoly price,
, Firm 2 will have one period lag to raise its price back to

based on Markov reaction

functions. As a result, Firm 1's inter-temporal profit today by charging its price at
became:
2
9

·0

1
8

·0

From this equation, Firm 1 gains

,
by cutting its price to

1.

2.5

today, but

lose its profit at 1/8 in the following two periods. Although there are many equilibriums
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which exist, the profits in the Markov perfect equilibrium are always bounded away from
the competitive profit.
A Repeated Bertrand Game Model
Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) studied an infinitely repeated Bertrand
game with the assumptions of publicly observed prices and privately observed and
independent and identically distributed cost shock in each period by firms. They found
that “a rigid-pricing scheme, where a firm’s collusive price is independent of its current
cost position, sacrifices efficiency benefits but also diminishes the information cost.”
Within their model and assumptions, the optimal symmetric collusive scheme can be
reached when the equilibrium-path price wars are absent and the price is rigid.
The Repeated Game. Each firm in this model observed the history of its own
cost draws

, price schedules

, and the realized prices of its rivals

, but cannot

observe rival cost types or rival schedules. The firm i’s payoffs are defined as
,
,

The sequence

∑

,

2.6

represents a vector of types and price schedules at date t, and

represents a public history of realized price vectors;

. is what is called the market-

share-allocation function. When firm i’s vector of realized price is ρ, its market share
would be

.

The symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE) is the focus in Athey et al.’s
model. This equilibrium implies that all firms suffer industry-wide future punishments
and rewards together, and their strategies depend only on the history of realized prices
which are publicly observed. By applying the tools of dynamic programming from the
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990 study, Athey et al. defined
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;

,

as the expected continuation payoff, where

price a firm selects, and

is the

is the expected price schedules that other firms will adhere to.

They simplified each firm's expected payoff from the symmetric price schedule to be
,

;

;

and created the following Factored Program.

The Factored Program: Firms choose price schedule p and continuation payoff function v
to maximize
,

;

;

subject to:
,
where V

,
,

, and

;

;

.

,

;

;

.

2.7

The lemma from Athey et al.’s Factor Program is that “Any symmetric public strategy
profile s* = (s*, ..., s*) is an optimal SPPE, if and only if its corresponding factorization
(p*, v*) which solves the Factored Program.”
The constraints of the Factored Program were put into two groups to formulate
the Interim Program for a repeated game with private information. The group of offschedule constraints is to prevent firms having off-schedule deviation, firms choosing a
price which is not in the range of p.2 The group of on-schedule constraints is to prevent
firms having on-schedule deviation, or firms choosing a price in the range of p based on
other cost level rather than their own. An example of on-schedule deviation is that a firm
with high-level cost charges prices the same as firms with low-level to win market share.

2

The range of p is a price strategy reflecting cost realization.
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The Interim Program: Firms choose price schedule p and continuation payoff function v
to maximize
,

;

;

Subject to:
,

Off-Schedule Constraints:
,

(IC-off1)
(IC-off2)

,
,

,

,

(IC-on2)

,

;

;

,

;

;

,

On-Schedule Constraints:
(IC-on1)

,

,
,

;

;

,

;

;

.

(2.8)
All letters above in bold represent vectors. Now the off-schedule constraints tell that a
firm has a higher expected payoff by charging a price based on cost level (including its
own and other possible cost levels) than by charging a price not based on cost levels.
Meanwhile, the on-schedule constraints mean that a firm has higher expected payoff by
charging a price at its own cost level than by charging a price at the imitating cost level.
Collusion among Patient Firms and Mechanism Design. Before finding out the
characterizations of the optimal model in this repeated game model, with the assumption
that firms are patient, a mechanism design program was developed by relaxing some
constraints from the Interim Program. When firms are sufficiently patient, the offschedule deviation can be relaxed without loss of generality since firms are not attracted
by off-schedule deviation anyway. The first on-schedule (IC-on1) can be relaxed by
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,

replacing with

,

sup

, where

3

. Then the Interim Program

yielded a new program.
The Mechanism Design Program: Firms choose price schedule p and a punishment
function T to maximize
, ;
Subject to: For all ,
(IC-onM)

,

, ;

where

, ,

0;

, ;
;

, ;

,

2.9

representing the current profit of a type θ firm
,

announcing that its type is . The function,

, is a general

“transfer” or “punishment” function that a firm expects to have when announcing . The
value of

greater than zero indicates a firm announced its type

war. In contrast, the zero value of

and there is a price

indicates a firm’s announcement of its type

and

there is no price war.
Based on their Mechanism Design Program, Athey et al. proposed that:
“Suppose
δ

,

0,1 such that, for all δ

δ, there exists an optimal SPPE which is

stationary, wherein firms adopt

after all equilibrium-path histories, and

solves the following program: maximize
, ,

, ;

0. Then

solves the Mechanism Design Program and

, ;

, ;

subject to

.”

They then developed two implications to establish this result: that
in the Mechanism Design Program. Since

,

0 is optimal

is a transformation of the expected payoff

3

According to Athey et al. (2004), this relaxed constraint allows
is not for sure.
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, even though

is a solution to the Interim Program4 as long as other constraints

,

function,

,

are also satisfied. As a result, the first implication is that

is weakly superior

to any SPPE factorization; mathematically,
, ;

.

2.10

When firms are very patient, in each period, firms repeatedly play

and

0, which

satisfy the on-schedule constraint, as long as no firm deviates in the future. The offschedule deviation is always deterred by the punishment of all firms playing the Static
Nash Equilibrium. Hence, the other implication is
⁄ 1

, ;

.

2.10

From inequalities 2.10 a and b, an equation is established as
, ;
period and this

1

. This optimal SPPE shows that firms play
, ;

solves the static program: maximize

, ,

, ;

, ;

,

0 solves the Mechanism Design Program.

in every

subject to

, under the conditions that firms are sufficiently patient and

To analyze the characteristics of

,

which satisfies the constraints in the

Mechanism Design Program, the constraints are reduced by the following lemma:
“ ,

satisfies (IC-onM) if and only if

(ii)

, ;
, ; |

4

,

satisfies: (i)

is weakly increasing, and

, ;

, ;

, where

, ;

0.”

,

and

0, so

.
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,

, which implies

One easy way to understand (ii) is to consider a firm with the cost type
below . If this firm does not pretend to be type
firm with type

which is

, it will gain the same profit as the

plus an extra portion from its lower cost. By the same token, a firm with

cost type lower than

will earn a little extra than the firm with type

does. So for any

type , a firm earns the profit which equals the profit that the firm with the top cost type
plus the accumulate efficiency rents (due to lower cost) of higher types. So what (ii)
saying is that the profit of a firm with any cost type is the same as the profit earned by the
firm with the highest cost type plus its accumulated efficiency rent of higher types. This
theory implies as long as the profit-at-the-top is relatively larger than the accumulated
efficiency rent, a firm with the highest cost type will have less possibility to behave as a
lower cost type.
The magnitude of the efficiency rents can be transformed into the allocation of
market share across firms' types. A firm expects its market share

;

;

when it announces its type , and all firms announce their types truthfully. The
magnitude of the efficiency rents now can be written:
, ;

;

.

2.11

In Athey et al.'s (2004) finding, given an original incentive-compatible scheme
and market-share allocation, an alternative incentive-compatible scheme can be
constructed that delivers the same market-share allocation without using wars, while also
providing the same profit-at-the-top. They, therefore, claim a lemma that “Given a
scheme

,

0, and associated market-share allocation

that satisfies (IC-onM) and
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;

,

, there exists an alternative scheme
;

such that

;

0 which also satisfies (IC-onM), and

, ;

and

, ;

Following this lemma, the interim profit of firm with type

.”

in the above lemma can be

re-written as below by using equation 2.11:
, ;

, ;

;

.

2.12

Another of their findings is called the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. In that
theorem, firms start with the scheme ,
other scheme

,

which also satisfies the on-schedule constraints provides the same
, ;

profit-at-the-top
;

, which satisfies on-schedule constraints. If any

;

and the same market-share allocation

, this scheme will yield the same interim profit for all types of firms

as that they initially have because the same efficient rent is maintained for all cost types
;

;

.

In short, by taking account for the incentive constraint, firms choose their price
scheme to determine the profit-at-the-top and choose whether to implement the
corresponding market-share allocation along with corresponding price wars. As long as
firms determine the profit-at-the -top and the market-share allocation, their interim profits
are fixed with their own cost type.
Optimal Collusion among Patient Firms. Several steps were taken by Athey et
al. (2004) in analyzing the optimal collusion among patient firms. A fully sorting5
symmetric collusive scheme was first considered. Then they studied whether wars are

5

The definition of fully sorting is

is strictly increasing.
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required on an equilibrium-path for an optimal SPPE. Finally, the optimal pricing scheme
was established.
The possible profits with strictly increasing pricing function in the first period can
be formed based on the SPPE constructed in the previous section. Because the pricing
increase with firms’ cost level, a firm with the highest cost has no sales and with the
profit-at-the-top equal to

. Meanwhile, for any kind of fully sorting scheme, the

market share allocation is always

;

1

because a firm only wins

market share while all other firms announce their types with higher cost levels. Since the
same market share allocations yield the same efficiency rents, fully sorting pricing
schemes which satisfy on-schedule constraint are different only when their profit-at-thetop,

, is different. Therefore, the fully sorting pricing schemes which yield the

best profit-at-the top are at the place that

equals zero. However, one of the fully

sorting pricing schemes, the Nash-pricing Function,
onM). In the previous section, it was proved that

, has

,

0 satisfying (IC-

0 corresponds to

,

for all . As a result, the best collusive scheme that is fully sorting in the first period
yields expected payoffs equal to

, the profit from the static Nash Equilibrium

plus the discounted profit from the best available continuation SPPE.
Now consider the fully sorting pricing scheme in every period, and

is super

than any other set of SPPE; then based on the discussion in the previous paragraph,
could be written as
expressed as

. After this equation being rearranged,
⁄ 1

is then

; this equation means that the optimal SPPE with the
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condition that pricing is fully sorting in every period is simply firms playing the static
Nash equilibrium.
No Wars on Equilibrium Path. This proposition by Athey et al. (2004) based on
their lemma from their Mechanic Design Program and their Revenue Equivalence
Theorem. First, from that lemma, any original scheme

,

including a price war could

be replace an alternative no price war scheme which also satisfies the on-schedule
constraints, provides the same profit-at-the-top, and maintains the same market-share
allocation. Since the profit-at-the-top and the market-share allocation are the same, this
alternative no price war scheme also provides the same rent efficiency and thus the same
interim profit based on the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. The instruments to control the
SPPE are price and war; thus, by trading war with higher prices, the no war scheme
which provides the same interim profit as the original scheme exists. Incorporating the
stationary proposition from the Mechanism Design Program into this argument, the
following proposition is addressed:
,

“Allow for any distribution function F. If
Program, then there exists as well a solution

is a solution to the Mechanism Design
,

with

and

0.

Thus, if firms are sufficiently patient, there then exists an optimal SPPE that is stationary:
firms use the pricing scheme
and

, ;

⁄ 1

following every history along the equilibrium path,
.”
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After establishing the claim that the alternative schemes exist, Athey et al. then
characterize the optimal SPPE pricing scheme when firms are patient, which implies a
sufficient large δ6,
(i)

If the distribution function

is log-concave, or the difference between

customer’s reservation price, r, and the highest cost type,

, is sufficiently large,

the optimal SPPE would be that a firms charges the price at r in each period
regardless of its own cost type, as long as all firms charge the price at r in all
previous periods.
(ii)

When firms are sufficiently patient, they can always have a higher profit in a
single period by playing rigid pricing than playing the static Nash equilibrium.
FS

πNE ⁄ 1

δ .

To prove the characteristics of the optimal SPPE above, a firm's expected payoff
0 (no price war).

function is written from equation (2.12) with
, ;

,

·

;

6

;

.

2.13

A sufficient large δ weights the future pay off more. Without this condition, firms
would more like to deviate in the current period. This implies the condition that firms are
sufficiently patient.
22

By borrowing the some rules from Bulow and Robert's (1989) study on optimal auction,
the efficiency rent in the right bracket can be rewritten in the following way,
;

;

;

,

;

;

;

·

;

2.14

.7

Substituting the equation (2.14) into the term represents efficiency rent in the equation
(2.13); firms’ objective function is rewritten as
, ;

,

·

;

·

;

.

2.15

The profit-at-the-top, the first term in the right-hand side bracket, is determined
by the profit of the firm with the highest cost level. To maximize the profit-at-the-top, all
firms need to set the same price to prevent the firm with the highest cost level from
under-pricing. As a consequence, firms gain the most profit by fixing their

in

each period.
The

⁄

in the second term measures the contribution of an increase in

type ’s profit to the firm’s expected profit. The log-concave F is to make sure that
⁄

is non-decreasing. Consequently, market share is allocated to the firms with

higher types and away from those with lower types; these are also more efficient firms.
This allocation of market share improves firms’ cartel profits. As a result, firms’ rigid-

7

, is defined to be zero for
and one for
, which can be understood
intuitively that firm’s real cost type will not greater than the lowest cost realized in the market,
otherwise the efficient rent will not exist.
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pricing scheme

not only maximized a firm’s profit-at-the-top but also the
·

expected efficiency rent term,

;

.

Before constructing a mathematic proof that a rigid-pricing scheme maximized
the expected efficiency term, First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) is introduced
here first (Hadar & Russell, 1969). A random variable A has first-order stochastic
dominance over the random variable B if for any outcome x, A gives at least as high a
probability of receiving at least x as does B. In notation form,
for all .
If the cumulative distribution function of A is

and of B is

, then A first-

order stochastically dominating B means
for all .
One of the results derived from FOSD is that if A first-order stochastically
dominates B, then
for all increasing function .

2.16

Now considering that a firm has an expectation of its market share to be 1/ ,
;

1/ , before knowing its cost type, the probability distribution can be

defined as:
;

;
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.

2.17

A rigid-pricing scheme

,

, implies

1/ . Since a price scheme is non,

decreasing with cost type, market share allocation,

, is non-increasing. This

theory implies that given any kind of cost type, a rigid-pricing scheme provides the
smallest market share allocation. Thus,
;
This means that

;
.;

;

dominates

.;

;

2.18

by FOSD for all p. In words, a rigid-pricing

scheme puts the most weight on high-cost types. If

⁄

is non-decreasing, with

the derived result from FOSD (2.16), it follows that
·

1

;

·

,

1

,

;

2.19

for all p non-decreasing. Finally, only a rigid-pricing scheme can be optimal because of
the equation, 0

for

, with the assumption that f is greater than zero.

If a pricing scheme is not rigid, more weight would be placed on
When firms adopt a pricing scheme,

.

, the profit-at-top is maximized;

meanwhile, this pricing scheme itself is also a optimal rigid-pricing scheme, guaranteeing
the send term in firms’ objective function. In short, when the cost distribution is logconcave, the optimal SPPE can be reached if firms are sufficiently patient and play rigid
pricing at r in each period. This implies that the variability of firms’ prices over time is
smaller under a collusive regime than competitive regime.
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A Dynamic Collusion Pricing Model
In many antitrust cases, it is the buyers, not the antitrust authorities, playing the
important role in detecting a cartel’s price-fixing behavior, for example, lysine and
vitamin cases. Hence, in addition to focusing on the stability of the collusion, firms also
devote efforts in avoiding detection from buyers. When setting prices, the cartel will
consider what price pattern will, or will not, cause the buyer to suspect the existence of
the cartel. An abnormal or unexplainable price pattern makes buyers become suspicious
and take steps to engage in detection. Harrington and Chen (2006) pursue this idea and
develop a novel theory of belief formation. In Harrington and Chen's theory, buyers have
their own beliefs about price changes based on the historical prices, and when the
likelihood of the recent prices based on this belief is very small, buyers will more likely
become suspicious that a cartel may exist. Based on this theory, a dynamic programming
problem is set up to present the process of the buyers forming their belief of price
changes which determine the endogenous terminal date of a cartel. This terminal date
determines the profit after the collusion is detected; the penalties are based on the price
and cost during the collusion period.
There are several properties that have been found in Harrington and Chen’s
dynamic program system. Two phases construct the cartel price path: a transition phase
and a stationary phase. In the stationary phase, price is much less volatile than price in a
competitive regime or a monopoly regime. In the transition phase, under some specific
parameter set in this model, the price path is rising, overshooting, and converging into
stationary phases. This dynamic model shows that it takes more time for cost shocks
passing through to price under a collusion regime. Although Harrington and Chen's
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dynamic model is obviously exploratory, the price paths from this model are more like
the collusion pricing in the real business world than those that have been developed by
the theory of collusive pricing. The following is the brief summary of their program
system.
Market Condition. The Oligopoly Market is assumed to be symmetric and faces
linear fixed market demand function overtime.
,

,

0

2.20

With the assumption of constant marginal cost which is allowed to vary stochastically,
the industry profit becomes:
, where

,

is the unit cost at time t.

2.21

More assumptions were established for that stochastic marginal cost. First,
,

random walk with the boundary of
which is notated as

and 0

is a

. The cost shock at time t,

, is assumed normally distributed and i.i.d. overtime. So costs are a

stochastic process we can represent as:
,

,

2.22

Let p c represent the price the firms charge when the collusion does not exist. Then the
profit of the industry is expressed as:
̂

̂

The present value of the industry's payoff at time t,

2.23
, is the sum of discounted

future expected profit.
W c

π c

δ
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W v c

ε

f ε; με , σε dε.

2.24

where

is the discount factor and

0, 1 ; f ε; µ , σ

is the density function for the

normal distribution of ε.
Cartel Detection. Firms realize they have some probability of being detected
when forming a cartel, and being detected involves being charged penalties. Instead of
being detected by antitrust authorities, in reality, many cartel cases are detected by
purchasers in the industries. For example, as McAnney (1991) discusses in his study:
As a general rule, the [Antitrust] Division follows leads generated by disgruntled
employees, unhappy customers, or witnesses from ongoing investigations. As
such, it is very much a reactive agency with respect to the search for criminal
antitrust violations. … Customers, especially federal, state, and local procurement
agencies, play a role in identifying suspicious pricing, bid, or shipment patterns.
(pp. 529, 530)

What often catches purchaser attention and alerts others to the existence of collusion
behavior is anomalous pricing. Hence, in Harrington and Chen’s (2006) study, they
constructed a model that makes purchasers think there is possibility that firms are
colluding. Unlike other papers using a Bayes-Nash equilibrium to form the collusion and
non-collusive pricing function, their model does not assume that purchasers know the
collusive pricing function or purposely look for it. The assumption in this model is that
when some abnormal thing happens in the pricing pattern, buyers will be suspicious of
the possibility of the formation of a cartel.
The underlying concept behind this model is that buyers have beliefs about the
price process. Hence, when the buyers feel the observed price series significantly differs
from their beliefs, they become suspicious about the possibility of cartel forming. Hence,
the task in Harrington and Chen's study is to model what it means for buyers to observe
an anomalous event. In the previous section, the stochastic process of a firm's marginal
cost is a random walk with a normally distributed cost shock. As a consequence, the
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buyers' belief of the price series is also a random walk. So price at time t can be written
as:
2.25
Here buyers know that

is normally distributed because they presume that the price

function determined by the cost and the change in costs is normally distributed. However,
buyers have no idea what the coefficients are of the costs which construct the price
function and also do not know the moments of cost distribution. As a result, purchasers
do not know the moments of the distribution of price changes, such as mean and variance.
Hence, the way in which purchasers derive their belief of those moments of the
distribution of price changes depends on their observed prices. The moments constructed
by the buyers are the price changes from the k periods which buyers could memorize up
to the current period t. The path of the price change could be show as:
∆

,…∆

,

where ∆

As a consequence, the ith moment of the distribution in t is based on purchasers’ memory;
it is expressed as,
∑

∆

2.26

Purchasers assume that the price change over period is normal distributed based on the
sampling moments,

,

. When buyers test a sequence of z < k

most recent observed prices up to the price at period t, the likelihood of the z most recent
price changes is specified to be
П

∆ ;
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,

2.27

The highest likelihood that the price change could be assigned over a period of time is the
maximum likelihood. Since the time that buyers observe the price change is known, from
z to t, the maximum likelihood is denoted as
П

max

;

,
;

П

2.28

,
⁄

The realized likelihood relative to maximum likelihood,

, determines

purchasers’ suspicions. It is assumed that the probability of detection decreases as the
relative likelihood increases. The function can be formed as
1

,

0,

,

0

2.29

The constant, α0, is the effect of detection not related to price, such as an incidental
discovery or an internal whistleblower.
The first step to numerically implementing the model with anomalous event is to
manipulate the moments:
1

1

∆
1

∆

∆

∆

1

∆

∆

2.30

This manipulation shows that to update moment i due to the observed price change from
period t-1 to t, a weight of 1/k is transferred from the t-kth observation to tth observation.
Now instead of being transferred from only one observation, a weight of 1/k is transferred
from all past observations and assigned to a new observation. The ith moment of the
equation could be re-written as:
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1

1

∆
1

1

1

1

∆

1

∆

∆

∆

∆
2.31

∆

This equation can be generalized as the following:
1

∆

2.32

By using an analogous procedure, the approximation of the likelihood is then
⁄

∆ ;

,
⁄

∆ ;

,

2.33

Similar steps were used for the maximum likelihood, and we can thus derive the relative
likelihood:
∆ ;

,
;

The value of

,

,

0,1

2.34

reflects the magnitude of the price change observations used by

purchasers in testing. However, instead of knowing k state variables, now purchasers’
focus will be on the three state variables,

,
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,

.

Some further assumptions are made to simplify the model; Φ, which represents
the set of price changes, is assumed to be finite for numerical purposes. As a result, the
price changes in purchasers’ beliefs are a discrete normal distribution. A probability
density function of a normal distribution,

., ,

., ,

, ,
, ,

∑

; ,

, is replaced with

where:

Φ

2.35

0
Harrington and Chen (2006) then assume that the cartel's damages will evolve in
the following manner:
,
where

0, 1 ,

0,

is the cartel price at time .

2.36

The symbol Xt is the cartel's damages at the time when the cartel is detected.
Since it is difficult to document the damage occurred in the period prior to the detection,
a deterioration rate, 1

, is assigned in (2.36). In the other words, instead of catching

the full damage from previous period, Xt includes only part of the damage from the
,

previous period. The level of damages at the current period t is expressed as

with a multiplier, , which is the firm's expectation of the payment if the cartel is caught.
To be consistent with U.S. antitrust practices, a specific formula is constructed:
,

̂

2.37

The competitive benchmark, or "but for" price in the equation (2.37) is ̂
̂

overcharged by the cartel is

, so the price

.

The problem that a cartel faces is choosing the price in the current period, t, with
the state variables

,

,

,

,

. The symbols

and

the price and accumulated damage prior to the current period respectively;
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represent
is the cost in

the current period. The first moment of the price change in the purchasers’ belief is
, and the relative likelihood that purchasers attach to recent prices is

donated as

. If the price change in the current period is given as

donated as

, the equations of

motion can be expressed as:
p

p

p

,

1

λ m

λ

,m
where

,
; m , w σε
; m , w σε

,m
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The price the cartel chooses will not be lower than the lowest costs among cartel
members, . Meanwhile, the highest price that the cartel can charge,

, is higher than the

joint profit-maximizing price. To make sure price changes remain within this boundary,
the set of price changes is slightly modified as,
Φ: p

Φ

,

2.39

By adopting the equations in (2.38), the cartels' objective function is defined recursively:
,

,

,

,

,
;

1

,

,

,
,

,
;

,

,

,
1

,

.

,

,
2.40
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This first term in the function above represents what the cartel earns as current
profit by increasing price by

. The expected future profit that a cartel can earn depends

on the probability of a cartel’s being detected,

,

. If the cartel is

detected, firms receive non-collusive profits after detection and need to pay the penalties
of overcharges and fines. If the cartel is not detected, the cartel’s expected future profit is
that which is attached to colluding, given the new values to the state variables.
By using certain specific parameters, Harrington and Chen (2006) then produced
a collection of price paths to identify how a cartel price path compares to that for a noncollusive industry. Several results came from the price patterns they produced. Figure 2
shows their simulated cartel price path:

Figure 2. Simulated Cartel Price Path
Source: Harrington and Chen (2006)

34

According to their simulated price path, they first found that there are a transition
phase and a stationary phase on the cartel price path. The price moves largely
independent of cost in the transition phase and is responsive to cost in the stationary
phase. The price rises steadily and may decrease modestly in the transition state. The next
finding is that two conditions cause the period to become shorter, and the price path rises
faster in the transition phase. One condition occurs when the variance of cost shock is
greater and the other one is at the time the purchasers' beliefs are more sensitive to recent
price changes. Their final finding regarding the simulated price path, which is also the
main concern in this study, is that the variability of the cartel price is much less than the
non-collusive price.
Based on the theories discussed in this chapter and many empirical studies8, the
lower variance on price series is a remarkable marker for firms’ collusive behavior.
Because of this result of firms’ collusive behavior on price patterns, a methodology
which can detect the change of variance will be able to detect the true timing of
successful collusive periods.

8

An example has been discussed in Introduction.
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Chapter 3
The Iterated Cumulative Sums of Squares Algorithm
Inclan and Tiao (1994) studied the detection of multiple changes of variance in a
sequence of time series. They consider data series that exhibit a stationary behavior for
some time; then suddenly the variability of the error term changes; it stays constant again
for some time at this new value, until another change occurs. Their approach proposes
using cumulative sums of squares to search for change points systematically at different
pieces of the series. This approach is based on a centered version of the cumulative sum
of squares in Brown, Durbin, and Evens’ (1975) study.
Centered Cumulative Sums of Squares
In order to detect the point of variance change of a series, the variance of a given
sequence of observations should be studied retrospectively. Let C

∑

A represents

the cumulative sum of squares of a series of uncorrelated random variables
mean zero and variances

with

, t = 1, 2… and then the centered (and normalized)

cumulative sum of squares can be written as
D

C

C

k

T,k

1, … , T, with D

DT

0

3.1

If the series is with homogenous variance, the plot of D against k will oscillate
around 0. If there is a sudden change in variance at some observation, the plot of D will
have a high probability of showing a pattern going out of some specified boundaries.
These boundaries are decided from the asymptotic distribution of D which assumes
constant variance. Because of this behavior of D , a variance change point can be
searched via max |D |; k is assumed to be the value of k so that max |D | is attained at
k. Then we should see if the maximum absolute value goes over a predetermined
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boundary. If it does, we may conclude two things: the change point is near k , and k can
be taken as an estimate of the change point. According to the theory of variance
T⁄2 D is similar to that of a Brownian

homogeneity, the asymptotical behavior of
bridge, where the asymptotic critical value of

.

equals 1.358 (

.

equals 1.224) (see

Table 2). Hence, that the upper and lower boundaries in the Dk plot are at ±1.358
(±1.224). When Dk falls out of these boundaries, the possible change of variance exists.
Figure 3(a) represents a white noise series with homogenous variance, and Figure
3(b) is a series with two changes of variance. The first break is at t=235, and the other
0.000093,

break is at t=279. The variances are
0.001288,

235, … 278; and

0.00384,

1, … ,234;

278, … 368 . The

functions

of these two series are shown in Figure 3(c) and 3(d). Figure 3(c) shows the

functions

of the series with constant variance, where

presents roughly a straight line with slope

0.00005. The plot in Figure 3(d) appears as some broken lines consisting of several
straight pieces. These broken lines occur when there are changes in the variance of the
series.
Although the example shown in Figure 3(d) has the slope of
when there is a change in variance, in some series, the slope of
sometimes the change of slopes in
positive, the plot of
, the slope of

is not dramatic and the

dramatic changes

changes slightly. Since
function is always

presents a better picture. Even with a slight change in the plot of
shows a drastic change with a change of sign. When the variance

changes to a smaller value, the slope of

creates a peak; in contrast, when the variance

changes to a greater value, the slope creates a trough. Unlike
straight line with a positive slope, the plot of

37

which appears as a

is a horizontal visual reference. Figures

3(e) and 3(f) are the plots of

of the series with constant variance and the series with

two variance changes, respectively. However, as we can see in the figure 3(f), there are
many points which fall out of the boundaries; in order to detect the real change points of
volatility, Inclan and Tiao (1994) generate the ICSS algorithm which will be discussed in
the next section.

Table 2
Empirical and Asymptotic Quantiles of
T

100

200
SE

p

⁄2 |
300

SE

|
400

SE

∞

500
SE

SE

.05

.44

.003

.47

.003

.47

.003

.48

.003

.049

.003

.520

.10

.50

.003

.52

.003

.53

.003

.53

.003

.054

.002

.571

.25

.60

.004

.63

.003

.63

.003

.64

.003

.065

.003

.677

.50

.75

.004

.78

.003

.78

.003

.79

.003

.080

.003

.828

.75

.94

.004

.97

.004

.97

.004

.97

.004

1.00

.004

1.019

.90

1.14

.006

1.16

.006

1.18

.007

1.18

.006

1.20

.006

1.224

.95

1.27

.009

1.30

.004

1.31

.008

1.31

.010

1.33

.009

1.358

.99

1.52

.004

1.55

.012

1.57

.028

1.57

.020

1.60

.018

1.628

Note. Estimated from 10,000 replicates of series of T independent N(0,1) observations
P sup |W | D
p.
Source: Inclan and Tiao (1994)
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is defined by

0.10

0.10

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.00

-0.05

-0.05

-0.10

-0.10
0

100

200
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Source: The IBM stock closing prices as reported by Box and Jenkins (1976)
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The ICSS Algorithm
The Dk function does not always provide a satisfactory procedure. It may provide
a satisfactory procedure only when the possible existence of a single point of change is
taken into consideration. The question regarding the usefulness of the Dk function arises
when multiple points of variance change on an observed series are points of interest. This
problem can be solved by following an iterative scheme. The scheme depends on the
successive application of the Dk function to pieces of the series. When a possible change
point is found, the function divides it consecutively.
It is assumed that A[t1 : t 2] represents the series At1, At1+1…, At2, t1 < t 2 and
Dk(A[t1 : t 2]) represents the range over which the cumulative sums are obtained. The
steps below are the procedure of iterated cumulative sums of squares algorithm,
Step 1: Set t1 =1;
Step 2: Find k A t : T , which is the point where max |D A t : T | is obtained, by
calculating D A t : T , where T is the total time zone.
Let M t : T

max

T

T

t

1 /2|D A t : T |. Compare M and D , which is

1.358 (or 1.224), when p=.95 (or p=.10). If M
point at k , and proceed to next step. If M

, we consider there to be the change

D , k is not considered to be the change

point in the series and the algorithm stops.
Step 3: Let t
M

k . Then calculate D A t : t

, and compare M t : t

and D . If

, then there is a new change point, and we need to repeat Step 3 until M

Then the first change point is k f
D A t : T . When M

D , let k

t . Similarly, let t
t

1.
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k

1 and calculate

D .

Step 4: When k f
kf

and k

k

, we need to repeat Step 2 and Step 3 on the series between

.

Step 5: Finally, we should arrange the possible change points in an increasing order if we
find out two or more change points are possible. Suppose cp is the vector of all the
possible change point found so far. Then we define the two extreme values

0 and

1 , where NT is the total change points found in the previous steps. To check
1:

each possible change point, we calculate
should keep the point only if

1:

,

1, … ,

. We

. This step needs to be repeated

until both of the following requirements are met: the number of change points does not
change any more, and the points found in each new pass are “close” to those in the
previous pass.
The Literature with Applications of the ICSS Algorithm
The ICSS Algorithm has been commonly used in the finance research field. Many
economists, researchers, and policy makers are interested in volatility changes in a
variety of stock markets, exchange markets, and future markets. Among those
researching these market structures, the ICSS algorithm is used very often in detecting
changes of volatility.
Aggarwal, Inclan, and Leal (1999) examined whether global or local events are
more important in causing large shifts in the volatility of emerging stock markets. At the
same time, they also examined the events which cause large shifts in the volatility; these
events tend to be social, political, or economic events. Unlike many other studies in
which regime shifts are first indentified, their study first detected shifts in volatility from
the data, and then examined local and global events that occurred around those time
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periods. The method that they used to detect points of sudden changes in variance is the
ICSS algorithm. After the changes points were detected, they introduced a dummy
variable into the variance equation of the GARCH model to account for the sudden
changes in variance. They concluded their finding that those major changes in volatility
seem to be related to important country-specific political, social, and economic events.
The only global events which cause significant change in the volatility of several stock
markets is the crash in October 1987.
Bracker and Smith (1999) found that copper futures returns are characterized by
negative skewness and excess kurtosis which contribute to their volatility. They first
detected alternating sub-periods of volatility by using the ICSS algorithm to identify
break-points in the series, and then they compared the ability of random walk, GARCH,
EGARCH, AGARCH, and the GJR model to capture the volatility within each ICSS
identified sub-period.
Malik (1999) detected time periods of sudden changes in volatility by using the
ICSS algorithm for the Japanese yen, British pound, Canadian dollar, French franc, and
German mark from January 1990 to September 2000. He then examined economic events
surrounding those shifts and incorporated these sudden changes in variance to the
standard GARCH model. By accounting for volatility shifts in the model, the persistence
in volatility was reduced.
Knowing that financial market participants are interested in what events can
change the volatility pattern of financial assets and how unanticipated shocks determine
the persistence of volatility over time, Malik and Hassan (2004) studied these issues by
detecting time periods of sudden changes in volatility by using the ICSS algorithm. They
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examined financial, industrial, consumer, health, and technology sectors in Dow Jones
indexes with the data series cross from January 1992 to August 2003. They found that
accounting for volatility shifts in the standard GARCH model considerably reduces the
estimated volatility persistence. These results have important implications regarding asset
pricing, risk management, and portfolio selection.
Solakoglu and Demir (2009) studied the sensitivity of firm value to fluctuations in
exchange rates using a market model for Turkey’s financial sector. They utilized the
ICSS algorithm to identify the breakpoints in their samples. Based on the breaks, they
selected a stable period to analyze what roles the firm-specific factors play on significant
exposure to exchange-rate movements. Then they used a logistic regression and
considered only significant exposures. Their results indicate that exchange rates
movement more likely has less effect on larger firms. Family ownership, on the other
hand, causes an increase in the probability of observing significant exposure.
Wong and Moore (2009) also used the ICSS algorithm to investigate sudden
changes in volatility in the stock markets of new European Union (EU) members. The
data in their study is a weekly series and the sample period is from 1994 to 2006. They
first identified shifts in volatility with the ICSS algorithm. After the breakpoints of
variance changes were identified, Wong and Moore modified the standard GARCH
model by including the dummy variables for these breakpoints. By utilizing the ICSS
algorithm, they detected a time period of sudden change in variance of returns and the
length of this variance shift. Their study shows that sudden changes in volatility seem to
arise from the evolution of emerging stock markets, exchange rate policy changes, and
financial crises.
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Chapter 4
Two Empirical Studies
The majority of applications of the ICSS algorithm have been in finance. One
reason is that it is easier for researchers to access financial data and reach the number of
data points required for this technique. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ICSS
algorithm detects breakpoints better when the sample size is greater than two hundred
observations. The other reason is that for financial researchers or investors to obtain a
more profitable asset portfolio, changes in volatility persistence are one of their main
concerns.
Using the theory that data series should exhibit price rigidity in the collusion
period, (i.e., smaller variance within the cartel period), this is the first study to adopt the
ICSS algorithm in forensic economics. Two empirical cases, the flat glass and steel
industries, are studied in this chapter. Monthly data were used in these cases. In most
antitrust investigations, the daily transaction data are available between sellers and buyers,
and thus data sets of sufficient size are not unexpected.
Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation in the late 1980s and early 1990s
In 1993, two ex-executives of Libbey-Owens-Ford Company (“LOF,” a
subsidiary of the British glass producer Pilkington LLC), which is one of five major flat
glass manufacturers, alleged that during the early 1990s, LOF had conspired with its
competitors to fix the price of the glass product it sold.(In re Flat glass Antitrust
Litigation, 2002) Because of their allegation, in 1997, the plaintiff filed several private
antitrust lawsuits to allege LOF and its competitors violated the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act. (In re Flat glass Antitrust Litigation, 2002). These lawsuits were
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consolidated and were certified by the court with a conspiracy period between August
1991 and December 1995. The plaintiffs contended that the five major producers of flat
glass conspired to fix prices and allocate markets in both flat glass and automotive
replacement markets during the class period. The five major manufacturers were LOF;
AFG Industries, Inc. (“AFG”); Ford Motor Co. (“Ford”); Guardian Industries Corp.
(“Guardian”); and PPG Industries, Inc (“PPG”). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
formed and maintained their conspiracy through a series of letters, conversations, and
meetings, including at industry trade shows. The plaintiffs' allegations regarding pricefixing in the market for flat glass are relatively straightforward. Therefore, this study will
focus on the allegation of the defendants’ conspiracy in flat glass (In re Flat glass
Antitrust Litigation, 2004).
The Background of the Flat Glass Industry. Flat glass is glass produced
through what is called a float process in various options of size, thickness, and tint.1 The
U.S. flat glass industry earns multi-billions of dollars in revenue annually. However, this
"big money" industry was almost exclusively shared among five producers- PPG,
LOF, AFG, Guardian, and Ford. These five companies manufacture well over 90% of the
flat glass sold in the United States. Their market shares for 1995, based on shipments, are
presented in Table 3.
After the float process, flat glass could be sold as is, and this kind of flat glass is
used primarily in construction. Flat glass also can be "fabricated" into a variety of
products by subjecting it to a variety of processes. For example, the automobile industry

1

Float Process is to poured molten glass over a bath of a high-density liquid, such as
molten tin. As the glass floats on the top of the bath, it is polished under controlled temperatures.
Finally, the glass is fed into an “annealing oven” where it gradually cools and hardens.
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uses a substantial amount of fabricated flat glass. Flat glass may be molded and combined
with other parts to produce windshields as well as side and rear windows.

Table 3
Market Shares of Major Flat Glass Producers in 1995
Company

Market Share

PPG

28%

LOF(Pilkington)

19%

AFG(Asahi)

19%

Guardian

15%

Ford
Total

15%
97%

Source: In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation (MDL No. 1200), No. 03-2920, (3d
Cir.2004).

In this antitrust case, the plaintiffs offered substantial evidence tending to show
that the defendant companies mentioned previously had a motive to enter into a pricefixing conspiracy because of the characteristics of this industry. First of all, the flat glass
market was concentrated mainly in the defendants as described above. Since this market
was controlled by this small amount of manufacturers and the fixed cost of entry to this
industry was very high, no “fringe market” was available for smaller firms. This
limitation results in the entry barriers to the flat glass industry being very high. Secondly,
flat glass is generally a standardized product or what called a "commodity" product even
though it may vary in tint or thickness. This "commodity" characteristic results in the
price being the main reason that affects the purchasing decision. Flat glass is sold
primarily on the basis of price, and although it may vary in tint or thickness, it is
generally a standardized product. The plaintiffs also showed that the demand for flat glass
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was in decline in the beginning of the 1990s, and the defendants had excess capacity.
According to the economic theory, a decrease in demand and an excess in supply would
cause the price to decrease. According to many economics text books, these
characteristics of the flat glass industry make this industry susceptible to efforts to
maintain collusion pricing.
Beside the characteristics of the flat glass industry, the evidence showing that the
price increase was not correlated with any changes in costs or demand is an “anticompetitive” behavior. For example, in July of 1992, a PPG executive noted that “no one
believes that demand will be robust enough to support a price increase without significant
discipline on the part of all float producers.” After a price increase of flat glass in
September 1992 was implemented by the producers, a note from the same executive
addressed that this increase was not supported by basic supply and demand. (In re Flat
glass Antitrust Litigation, 2004).
Documents of Manufacturers’ Conspiracy. “Traditional” conspiracy evidence
comes from documents of the firms’ agreements. A series of evidence shows that these
five manufacturers agreed to raise the price of flat glass during three specific time frames:
June-July of 1991, September-October of 1992, and May-June of 1993.
In LOF's responding document to the Antitrust Division, even though it does not
directly state that it agreed with PPG to raise prices, one could infer such an agreement
from LOF's reference to an “across-the-board” price increase. According to Black's Law
Dictionary, “across-the-board” means “applying to all classes, categories, or groups.”
LOF's statement could be interpreted into three reasonable ways: First, LOF agreed with
one or more competitor to increase the price of all types of flat glass; Second, LOF
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agreed with all its competitors to increase prices on one or more category of flat glass;
and Third, LOF agreed with all its competitors to increase the price of all types of flat
glass.
On July 15, 1991, one of the defendants, AFG, first raised its prices, but none of
its competitors followed suit. However, not too long after AFG’s action, LOF executives
expressed that an 8% increase in flat glass prices would “hold” at a board meeting. After
meeting with two board members, PPG raised its flat glass prices by basically the same
amount that LOF executives thought would “hold.” During this period, the price being
increased by the same amount among flat glass manufacturers was initially successful,
but later became unsuccessful due to some of manufacturers’ failing to "hold the line."
According to an internal email, a Ford Regional Sales Manager had known the
precise date and amount that LOF was going to announce a price increase almost three
months ahead of time. Although a PPG executive did not believe that the market would
support a price increase, PPG and its competitors raised their prices by the same amount,
all within eight days of each other. After the price increases were announced, executives
from the various flat glass manufacturers participated in a trade show. At that show, an
executive from Guardian gave an executive from Pilkington a guarantee that Guardian
would be “fully supportive of the price increase proposition.”
In December of 1992, AFG and LOF discussed a price increase plan in May or
June 1993. Meanwhile, LOF also referred to such an increase for its budget for the fiscal
year 1994. A few months later, AFG faxed to PPG and Guardian a copy of a 5.5%
increase of the flat price which it planned to announce on May 17, 1993. After receiving
this fax, PPG announced an identical increase on May 12, and the rest of the flat glass
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producers quickly followed suit. In an LOF report, it stated that LOF was “monitoring the
market to make sure that all stick to the rules.” This time all flat glasses manufacturers
held this price increase firmly. In other words, no manufactures deviated at this time, and
this price increase was considered successful.
Data. Due to the legal issue, the internal transaction data of flat glass in this
antitrust case could not be revealed. In order to get an approximation of the flat glass
transaction price, the Producer Price Index (PPI) was used in this study. The Producer
Price Index Program measures the average change overtime in the selling prices received
by domestic producers for their output. Therefore, PPI for flat glass was considered a
good approximation for the flat glass transaction data. The monthly flat glass PPI from
January 1980 to December 1996 was obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
reason this time frame was chosen is that it ended after the claimed class period and
before the litigation started, and also provided sufficient observations.
One thing to address here is that the residual which is the regression result of the
price of products on demand and supply factors may be considered a comparable data
series for applying the ICSS algorithm. However, the residual is actually not as good as
the price to be studied here based on theoretically and empirically reasons. Based on the
theories discussed in Chapter 2, it is price rigidity rather than residual rigidity within the
collusion period. Empirically, the daily and weekly transaction data are available in
litigation cases and thus provide sufficient amount of data for the ICSS algorithm to use.
However, data represented demand and supply factors are usually obtained from public
sources and thus cannot provide sufficient amount of data. Therefore, in this study, the
modified price series is used for the examination of the ICSS algorithm.
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The Results of the ICSS Algorithm. According to those theories discussed in
Chapter 2, the variance of price is lower within the collusion period than within the
competitive period. Based on this characteristic of pricing patterns in the collusion
period, the ICSS algorithm is applied here to detect the change of the price variance.2 The
change of price variance provides the possibility of collusion existing. Figure 4 shows the
PPI series for flat glass. One condition of the series that ICSS can be utilized is that the
series needs to have a zero mean. Hence, the PPI for flat glass was modified by the
equation 4.1 to get a modified series which has a zero mean and still has the approximate
volatility for the PPI of flat glass. The following equation
̂

1

4.1

Where ̂ represent the modified price series,

is the PPI for flat glass,

is the average of

the PPI for flat glass over time. This modified series reflects the percentage deviation of
the PPI above or below the average PPI for flat glass. The modified series for flat glass
PPI shows in Figure 5. The time periods of a shift in volatility of the modified series
which are identified by the ICSS algorithm are shown in Table 4.

2

The ICSS Algorithms were running by WinRats, version 7.30. published by Estima.
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Table 4
Sudden Changes in Volatility of PPI for Flat Glass
Producer
Price Index

Flat Glass

No. of change
points

7

Time Period

Standard
Deviation

Variance

January, 1980-March, 1982

18.10317

4.25478

April, 1982-November, 1982

2.52852

1.59013

December, 1982-June, 1984

0.38900

0.62370

July, 1984-May, 1985

1.20167

1.09621

June, 1985-October, 1987

3.06679

1.75123

November, 1987-February, 1990

0.62068

0.78783

March, 1990-February, 1994

0.78134

0.88393

March, 1994-December, 1996

3.00377

4

1.74291
2

Note. All variance were multiplied by 10 , and all standard deviation were multiplied by 10 .

The time periods of December1982 to June 1984 and November 1987 to February
1990 have a lower variance than the periods before and after. The variance of the period
of December1982 to June 1984 was about 0.39, which is about six times lower than the
previous period and about three times lower than the following period. The variance of
the period before November 1987 to February 1990 is more than five times larger than
the variance of November 1987 to February 1990. Even though the variance of the period
after November 1987 to February 1990 does not increase dramatically, it still shows the
possible cheating or falling apart of the defendants’ collusive behavior. Therefore, these
two time periods, December 1982 to June 1984 and November 1987 to February 1990,
with the relatively lower variances are the suspected time periods that the defendants’
successful collusive behavior possibly existed, more precisely, the time periods that the
price was affected by the existing collusion.
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Damage Analysis. To estimate the damage in class action price-fixing litigation,
forensic economists first determine the percentage of overcharge, which is the extent to
which prices during the conspiracy were higher than they would have been absent the
conspiracy. Hence, overcharges are frequently measured by comparing actual prices
during the conspiracy to competitive-benchmark prices that reflect the prices existing in a
more competitive environment. The competitive benchmark prices are the prices charged
by the defendants within the periods of an unsuccessful conspiracy. Beside the effect
from defendant’s collusive behavior, other forces may cause prices to differ between the
conspiracy period and the pre- and post-conspiracy periods. To distinguish the effects of
these forces from the effect of the conspiracy, the damage analysis relies on the statistical
technique of regression analysis.
The class of models referred to as linear regression models is used to estimate the
relationship between the price of product and the explanatory variables (demand and
supply and the conspiracy variables). To study the movement of the price of flat glass in
response to demand and supply factors, the demand and supply equations are combined
into a single equation (by equating the quantity demanded to the quantity supplied),
which is a reduced form equation. The price of flat glass is thus dependent on both
demand and supply factors. Since the price-fixing conspiracy is an exogenous event –
that is not induced by the natural forces of demand and supply – that might influence
price, the regression equation also contains a dummy variable for the period of the
suspected conspiracy. Estimating the reduced form equation through regression analysis
yields parameter estimates for all of the demand and supply variables, as well as the
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conspiracy variable. The regression model for this flat glass study is a reduced form
equation as:
LFLAT = F (FRIT, NATGAS, WAGE, CONSTRUCTION, CONSPIRE)
where,

(4.2)

LFLAT = Logged value of monthly Producer Price Index for flat glass.
FRIT = Frit composite index.
NATGAS = The monthly price series of natural gas.
WAGE = The quarterly wages for all employees in the industry of flat
glass (in millions).

CONSTRUCTION = The value of construction put in place (in millions).
CONSPIRE = The Dummy variable indicating the conspiracy periods.
The main purpose of this model is to explain the behavior of flat glass prices in
response to demand, supply, and other factors. This model uses the natural log of PPI for
flat glass as dependent variable.
The demand for flat glass is closely linked to the general level of economic
activity, especially construction activity. Hence, monthly seasonally adjusted series of the
value of construction put in place3 is used to measure demand for flat glass from
construction activity. Real gross national product (GNP) was considered as a variable to
capture the effect from economic activity on demand other than construction. However,
the collinearity diagnostic shows that the variable GNP has very high multicollinearity
problem with the variable FRIT, and thus GNP was excluded in this model.
The supply variables in this model are basically the costs which determine the
production of flat glass. The cost of production of flat glass is a function of raw material
cost, wages, and energy costs. If there is any change in the cost of these inputs, the supply
3

This series is in 1996 dollars and obtained from U.S. Census Bureau.
54

curve will shift and lead to a change in the market prices. Frit and cullet are the two main
raw materials used in manufacturing flat glass. Frit is a combination of several inputs,
mostly silica sand, soda ash, and limestone and dolomite. Cullet is crushed glass and is
obtained from the production process itself. Since cullet is internally generated and the
cost of cullet is essentially the cost of producing flat glass, the cost of cullet is ignored in
this analysis. Frit constitutes about 80% of the input mix for the production of flat glass,
and cullet the remaining 20%.
To measure the cost of frit, an index was used in the model. This index is a
weighted average of PPIs for glass sand (99.4% of which is silica dioxide), natural
sodium carbonate and sulfate (soda ash), and lime including quick, hydrated, and dead
burned dolomite (limestone and dolomite). The weights assigned to each of the
individual series are 62%, 20%, and 18%, respectively. The PPI of glass sand was first
introduced in June 1982. Hence, the missing value of PPI for glass sand was imputed by
a regression model, which is presented in Appendix. The major energy source in
producing flat glass is natural gas; thus the monthly price series of natural gas4 was used
as another supply variable. The impact of labor costs on the prices of flat glass products
is represented by quarterly wages for all employees in flat glass industry.5
The impact of the conspiracy on the price of flat glass is estimated by using a
conspiracy dummy variable. This variable has a value of one during the conspiracy
periods and zero in the rest of the periods. The parameter estimate of the conspiracy
dummy indicates that the amount of the actual prices was higher or lower (depending on
4

The price series was obtained from the Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review,
Table 9-11.
5

The quarterly wages were obtained from Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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the sign of the parameter estimate) because of the conspiracy. The model with the
conspiracy periods defined by the ICSS algorithm will first be presented in this damage
analysis, and then the model with the class conspiracy period certified by the court.

Table 5
Flat Glass Model
Coefficient
[t]

Variable Name

Conspiracy Periods

0.05103
[12.98]***
0.00392
[17.28]***
-0.00350
[-0.86]
0.00006865
[0.45]
0.20431
[4.93]***
4.10190
[183.35]***

Based on
Court's certified class
Period[a]
-0.01164
[-1.74]*
0.00340
[9.50]***
0.00299
[0.53]
0.00037089
[1.84]*
0.21881
[3.75]***
4.11341
[133.11]***

R2

0.8652

0.7544

Adj-R2

0.8618

0.7482

F

254.23

121.62

Defined by the ICSS
algorithm

CONSPIRE
FRIT
NATGAS
WAGE
CONSTRUCTION
INTERCEPT

Note. Dependent variable = Lflat
June1980-December 1996.
Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets
* = significant at 90%; **=significant at 95%; ***=significant at 99%.
[a] Author’s model with certified conspiracy period of August 1991 - December 1995.

The result of the regression for flat glass study is presented in Table 5. The second
column contains the results of using the "suspected" conspiracy period from the ICSS
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algorithm. The coefficient of the variable named CONSPIRE reflects the different amount
that defendants charge between the conspiracy period and the non-conspiracy period.
Since the dependent variable is the log value of PPI for flat glass, the positive coefficient
of value 0.05103 means that producers overcharge on flat glass price by about 5.1%. The
coefficient of FRIT, which has the expected positive and significant sign, reflects that one
unit increase in the Frit composite index will increase flat glass price by about 0.4%,
given the value of other variables constant. The negative coefficient of NATGAS means
one unit change of natural gas price will decrease flat glass price by about 0.35%, given
the value of other variables constant; however, this coefficient is not significant, implying
that this coefficient is not different from zero. The variable WAGE has the coefficient
with the expected positive sign even though not at a significant level. The positive
coefficient of the variable CONSTRUCTION shows that given other variables constant, a
million dollar increase in construction put in place will increase the flat glass price by
about 20.4%. The large value for R2, Adjusted R2, and F-statistics show that this
regression model with the conspiracy period defined by the ICSS algorithm fits the data
very well.
The positive coefficient of the variable CONSPIRE has claimed that the ICSS
algorithm did successfully detect the conspiracy periods. In order to prove that the
conspiracy period detected by the ICSS algorithm provides a better result than the
conspiracy period from the physical evidence, the result of the same econometric model
with the class certified conspiracy period of August 1991 to December 1995 is shown in
the third column in Table 5. Unlike the model with the conspiracy period from the ICSS
detection, the coefficient in this model has a negative sign and is statistically significant.
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The value of this coefficient tells that defendants undercharge the flat glass price by about
1.2%, which means that defendants did not cause damage on the purchasers during the
certified class period.
The conspiracy periods detected by the ICSS algorithm do not overlap with
certified class periods in court; however some public documents have pointed out that the
collusive behavior among defendants in this antitrust case could start as early as 1986.(In
re Nelson v. Pilkington, 1998). For example, the ex-chief executive officer of LOF, who
alleged the conspiracy among the defendants in the early 1990s, had been at that CEO
position from 1986 to 1993 and was charged with conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, and
money laundering. Therefore, the results from the ICSS algorithm can explain that the
truly “successful” collusive period started in 1987 and broke down in 1990. Although no
physical evidence shows collusive behavior during period of late 1982 to the middle of
1984, which may due to no purchasers or authorities’ awareness, the producers did
overcharge their customers in pricing of flat glass.
To calculate the total damage on purchasers due to the defendants' collusive
behavior, the sales from defendants to purchasers during conspiracy periods need to be
collected. Due to the legal issue, the actual sales between defendants and purchasers in
this case are internal information and could not be revealed. However, manufacturers'
shipments, inventories, and orders in the industry of stone, clay, and glass product are
available from U.S. Census Bureau. Based on the definition of census, manufacturers'
shipments measure the dollar value of products sold by manufacturing establishments and
are based on net selling values after discounts and allowances are excluded. Hence,
manufacturers' shipments could estimate the sales in the industry of stone, clay, and glass
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products. This industry included three categories of products: glass containers, kitchen
articles and pottery, and other stone, clay, and glass products. The total value of dollars
for shipments for this industry during December 1982 to June 1984 was $76.7 billion. If
10% of the total shipments belongs to flat glass, a 5.1 % overcharge from producers of
flat glass causes the damage to purchasers up to $391 million (10%×$76.7 billion×5.1%).
Similarly, the total value of dollars for shipments between November 1987 and February
1990 was $146.3 billion. With the assumption of 10 % of shipments belonging to flat
glass products, the producers had overcharged sales by $746.4 million (10%×$146.3
billion×5.1%), which is total amount of the purchasers’ damage during that period. As a
result, the total damage to purchasers of flat glass products during these two collusive
periods was about $1.14 billion.
The Steel Industry in the 1920s and 1930s
The producers in the steel industry have significant ability in agreeing on pricefixing because the firms in the industry have monopoly power. The demand the steel
industry faces is inelastic, and thus firms can earn more profit by increasing the price in
the market. Also, due to large capital investments to enter the market, there are
substantial barriers to the entry of new firms.
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Table 6
Major Mergers in 1898 - 1901
Year

Number of
Companies

Company

Basic Steel Producers:
1898

Federal Steel

15% of ingot capacity

a

1899

National Steel

12% of ingot capacity

8

1900

Carnegie Steel

18% of ingot capacity

a

Steel Finishers:
1898

About 75% of tin plate output

36

About 80% of wire and wire products

19

1899

American Tin Plate
American Steel and
Wire
National Tube

75% of wrought tubing

13

1899

American Steel Hoop

Barrel hoops and cotton ties

1900

American Sheet Steel

About 70% of sheet steel capacity

17

1900

American Bridge

About half of structural steel business

26

1900

Shelby Steel Tube

About 90% of seamless tube output

13

1898

9

a

Federal Steel combined two major steel producers and a number of ore and
transportation firms. Carnegie Steel was a reorganization of an earlier group of
affiliated firms.
Source: Weiss (1961), Economics and American Industry.

Concentration and Entry. The steel industry in America was not very
concentrated until the end of the 1890s. A series of mergers in the steel industry occurred
at the end of the 1890s. Some important mergers which occurred between 1898 and 1901
are listed in Table 6. In 1901, a group of businessmen led by J.P. Morgan established a
corporation named United States Steel. This corporation was comprised of those
combinations in Table 6 and controlled the majority of Minnesota iron ore reserves.
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United States Steel was the largest corporation in the American steel industry up to that
time and also the first billion-dollar corporation in the United States. At that time, 44% of
the reported steel ingot capacity and 66% of output in the United States were controlled
by United States Steel. When it was initially organized, the ingot capacity of United
States Steel was more concentrated near the Great Lakes because it had no important
basic plants east of the Pittsburgh area, south of the Ohio, or west of the Mississippi. As a
result, United States Steel was even more powerful regionally than in the country as a
whole. By acquiring the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Rail road Company in 1907, United
States Steel dominated the steel industry in the South. In the West, United States Steel
did not produce steel until 1930. It started building its first fully integrated eastern plant
in 1951.
This market power of United States Steel caused the federal government to bring
an antitrust suit against it in 1911. The federal government attacked United States Steel
and its components as combinations in restraint of trade. The Supreme Court made a
judgment in this case in 1920. The Court denied the federal government’s accusation in
favor of United States Steel since there was no significant evidence that competitors were
abused or that the public were exploited. Hence, its control of half of the steel industry
was not illegal according to the Sherman Act.
The steel industry was no longer dominated by United States Steel in the early
twentieth century. Although it was still the largest producer, there were other seven big
firms in steel industry. Figure 6 shows the relative shares of eight big steel firms and
other small steel firms. These eight big firms accounted for about almost 80% of the
shares of total steel ingot capacity from the 1920s to the 1950s.
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Since the beginning of the 20th century, firms in the America steel industry
increased their market share mainly by mergers. No firms had the ability to use other
methods to increase their share by more than 4% of industry capacity. Among the top
three big steel companies, Bethleham was the only company with the ability to increase
its share by as much as 2% by growing internally. In the steel companies’ point of view,
it is usually more profitable to grow its corporation by acquiring and expanding firms
than by building new plants. First, it usually would cost a steel company much less to
acquire or to expand firms than to build a new plant. Furthermore, by acquiring plants, a
steel company also acquired existing customers belonging to those plants. Finally, the
acquired plants would disappear from the list of rivals of the acquiring company.
However, this trend of mergers in the steel industry was not good for the public. The
small amount of firms caused less possibility of competition. Meanwhile, less investment
in new steel capacity means less growing in the entire economy.
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Figure 6. Shares of Total Steel Ingot Capacity
Source: Weiss (1961), Economics and American Industry.

Inelastic Demand Curves. These big firms tended to behave very much as one
dominant seller in the steel industry. One main reason for these firms doing so is that the
demand curves they faced were inelastic. Several reasons cause the demand curve of the
steel industry to be more inelastic. The first reason is that most steel is used as an
ingredient of some other product for customers. A change in steel prices will not affect
the prices of most of these finished goods very much. For example, if it costs $150 worth
of steel to make an automobile, a 20% raise in the steel price would increase the price of
an automobile by $30. These increased amounts of the automobile would not
significantly reduce the number of automobiles being sold out. The other reason that the
demand of steel is inelastic is that there are not many good substitutes for steel. The
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prices of copper in 1930s were between 5.79¢ and 13.39¢ per pound, aluminum prices
were between 19.9¢ and 23.8¢, and hot-rolled steel bars were between 1.58¢ and 2.40¢.
Figure 7 shows the prices of these three kinds of metal from the year 1897 to 1960. The
price of hot-rolled steel is far lower than the other two kinds of metal. An estimate by the
economists retained by United States Steel in 1938 shows that the elasticity of demand
for steel is 0.3 to 0.4.
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Figure 7. Annual Average Primary Price of Steel, Copper and Aluminum
(Cents per pound)
Source: Metal Prices in the United States through 1998. U.S. Geological Survey.

The Steel Industry in Deep Depressions. Some individual steel companies
sometimes attempted to secretly cut down the price in order to get more customers in
economic downturns when these companies were operating far below their capacity.
Once price cutting became widespread, the steel industry leader would adjust the official
64

price to reflect this price-cutting behavior. These secret price cuttings induced several
price competitions during the depressions of 1921-22, 1931-33, and 1938 (Weiss, 1967).
The competition in 1921-22 was due to the unequal amounts of overcapacity
among steel firms. There was a shortage in the supply of steel during the post-World War
I period which gave many independent firms the opportunity to charge higher prices.
However, charging higher prices causes antagonism from their customers toward these
independent firms. On the contrary, unlike independent firms, United States Steel
maintained stable prices. When the shortage of steel did not exist anymore and the
recession occurred, these smaller firms were having troubles. During the recession,
United States Steel was able to keep operating at reasonable a level capacity. However,
the independent firms were only running at 20% to 35% of capacity. The low operating
rate of capacity caused these firms to suffer severe losses. In order to earn back
costumers, independent firms went into a price competition in the steel industry. What
stopped this competition was that United States Steel announced that it would match any
price cut by any major independent firm. Also the organization of mergers embracing the
leading price cutter had begun.
A main source of price cutting in the early 1930s was National Steel. National
Steel is a combination of many firms and thus had efficient new plants, its own ore, and
an aggressive management. As a result, unlike other independent firms, National Steel
was in a better position to take such actions as price cutting.
During the Great Depression, most steel prices declined. However, the price
decrease of different steel products varied. On the average, from 1929 to 1933, finished
steel prices fell about 20%. However, prices of sheet and strips dropped much more than
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this percentage while price of heavy steel product dropped much less. While cold rolled
strip prices fell by 39%, rail prices went down only 9%.6 What made this a huge
difference in price reductions was that the demand for most heavy steel products was
much more than the demand for sheet and strip. The main usage of sheet and strip is
consumer goods such as appliances and automobiles. In contrast, the primary usage of
heavy steel products was in capital goods and construction, the demand for which
declined most during the depression.
The first explanation for this lower price of sheet and strip is that some firms such
as National Steel could have a great reduction in cost and be able to offer lower prices
because they had installed the continuous strip firms. Another explanation is that this
section of the steel industry is relatively less concentrated than other heavy steel product
sections. Finally, the main customers of sheet and strip, especially automobile
companies, are big buyers. These buyers have more power to negotiate lower prices.
Unlike the previous competition impeded by the United States Steel, this
competition was hindered by the government. Congress passed the National Industrial
Recovery Act in 1933. This Act permitted industries to work out “codes” to control
competition and provide government enforcement in stopping competition. Among all
industries, the steel industry was one of the first to join this Act. The way the steel
industry worked out its codes to avoid secret price competition was its codes required
producers to file their minimum prices with the American Iron and Steel Institute and to
give ten days notice prior to price changes. The code had been forcing the producers to
operate their oligopoly price policy since almost any price cuts would be met by other
producers.
6

TNEC Hearings, op. cit., 10719-10721.
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Price competition came back in the depression of 1937-1939 when United States
Steel made a formal price reduction due to its announced prices not being competitive at
that time. A study made in connection with wartime price controls in 1943 showed more
price competition in the steel industry within this period.
According to Weiss’ study, the steel industry participants behaved as monopolists
due to the small number of firms and an inelastic demand curve in the 1920s and 1930s
except 1921-22, 1931-33, and 1938.
Data. The wholesale prices of semi-manufactured steel billets, prices of
composite iron and steel, and prices of composite finished steel are obtained from the
Survey of Current Business which is available in Federal Reserve Archival System for
Economic Research (FRASER). Due to data availability, the collected prices were from
January 1923 to December 1939. All metal prices were converted into cents per pound
and are monthly data and transformed into the modified series by the formula (4.1)
discussed in the previous flat glass case.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 show three different steel price series in cents per pound
and in modified numbers. The movements of these three price series were very similar,
and they closely parallel each other. However, in Baker’s (1989) opinion, the price of
semi-manufactured steel is preferred to the price series of composite finished steel. The
reason is that semi-manufactured products are close to supply substitutes. Products close
to supply substitutes are able to be thought of as homogeneous goods. Therefore, the
price of semi-manufactured steel is used in this study to be examined by the ICSS
algorithm and in damage analysis.
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Figure 8. U.S. Steel Prices 1923-1939 (Cents per pound)
Source: Survey of Current Business
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Table 7
Sudden Changes in Volatility of Steel Billets Prices
Modified
prices series

Semimanufactured
Steel Billets

No. of change
points

3

Time period

Variance

Standard
deviation

January, 1923 – July, 1924

0.00492

0.07016

August, 1924 – November, 1931

0.00429

0.06549

December, 1931 – May, 1938

0.01598

0.12641

June, 1938 - December, 1939

0.00025

0.01583

The Results of the ICSS Algorithm. At least until the 1960’s, the American
Steel Industry had been an oligopolistic industry and individual firms behaved
monopolistically by displaying a fixed price policy. To detect when the fixed price policy
was successfully implemented, the ICSS algorithm was used and the results are in Table
7. This table provides the information on the price competition and the collusion in
American Steel Industry. Here again those periods with relatively small variances were
suspected periods under price-fixing policy.
The variance in the period of August 1924 to November 1931 is almost 6 times
smaller than the variance in the period after. Although the variance in the period before
the period of August 1924 to November 1931 is only slightly larger, a more successful
collusive period is considered in the period of August 1924 to November 1931.7 The
variance of the period June 1938 to December 1939 is more than fifty times smaller than
the variance in the previous period. Therefore, a fixed pricing or collusion regime seemed

7

The overcharge would be larger if the period before August is also considered to be
collusive period.
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successfully established after June 1938. Weiss’ study states that there was price cutting
during 1931 to 1933, and 1938. However, according to the result from the ICSS
algorithm, the secret price-cutting among producers might happen over the total period
from 1931 to 1938. Although history did not record any competition during this period
prior to August 1924, there could be some price competition which was not detected at
that time due to its size. For example, some firms used secret price-cutting, but when
being monitored by other firms, they returned to collusive behavior. In short, the
suspected collusive periods were the periods of August 1924 to November 1931, and
June 1938 to December 1939.
Damage Analysis. As discussed in the flat glass study in the previous section, to
estimate the damage in the steel industry in 1920s to 1930s, the percentage overcharge by
steel producers needs to be determined first. Therefore, in order to measure overcharge
on purchasers of steel products, the actual prices during the conspiracy periods and
during competitive periods again need to be compared. Forces other than producers’
collusive behaviors may cause prices to differ between the conspiracy period and the preand post-conspiracy periods (non-conspiracy periods); hence, these forces and the force
from conspiracy are included in the model in analyzing producers’ damage on their
customers.
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The model for this steel study is adapted from the model and variables in Baker’s
(1989) study and modified to be a reduced form as:
LP = F (IRP, WAGE, ALUM, CAR, RAIL, Y, CONSPIRE)
where,

(4.2)

LP = Logged value of wholesale price of semi-manufactured steel billets.
IRP = Prices of composite pig iron prices.

WAGE = Monthly factory wages (per week) in iron and steel and their products
(excluding machinery).
ALUM = Monthly prices of aluminum prices.
CAR = Numbers of U.S. passenger cars.
RAIL = Numbers of rail freight cars shipped.
Y = Industrial Production Index.
CONSPIRE = Dummy variable indicating the conspiracy periods.
The main purpose of this model is to explain the behavior of steel prices in response to
demand, supply, and other factors. This model uses the natural log of the wholesale price
of semi-manufactured steel billets as dependent variable. The primary factors that affect
the demand of the steel are the output of the automobile, rail, and construction sectors of
the economy. The monthly U.S. production of passenger cars and the quantity of rail
freight cars shipped which represent the output of the automobile and rail sectors were
obtained from the Survey of Current Business. The industrial production seasonal
adjusted combined index, which is converted to the index based on 1919=100, is used as
a proxy variable for the construction sector of the economy. Finally, Baker claims that
the price of aluminum is likely both a demand substitute and a demand complement for
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steel. Thus, the price of aluminum is included in this model as a demand-shift variable
and was obtained from the trade publication Metal Statistics.
Two supply-shift variables are employed in this damage-analysis model. They are
the price of composite pig iron and monthly average factory weekly wages in iron and
steel and their products (excluding machinery).8 They were also both obtained from the
Survey of Current Business. A conspiracy variable is used to measure the impact of the
conspiracy on the prices of semi-manufactured steel. This variable within the suspected
collusion period detected by the ICSS algorithm is assigned the value of one and zero
otherwise. Hence, this conspiracy dummy variable is assigned one for the period of
August 1924 to November 1931and the period of June 1938 to December 1939.
To confirm that detection by the ICSS algorithm provides better conspiracy
periods, the conspiracy periods based on physical evidence were compared in this study.
According to Weiss’ study, that steel producers had secretly cut prices in 1931 to 1933
and 1938, these periods could be seen as competitive periods, or non-collusive periods.
As a result, conspiracy periods in physical evidence could be defined by periods other
than those competitive periods. Since no specific months are listed in his study but only
years are available, there would be 67,392 possible combinations of conspiracy periods9.
These possible conspiracy periods are also used in this model to examine whether the
steel producers overcharge the price for steel within the conspiracy periods implied from

8

Since the data of wage for iron and steel and their products (not including machinery)
were only available before February 1938, U.S. Steel corp. wage rate were used for data before
February 1938.
9
Based on Weiss’ study, the first competitive periods could start from January 1931 to
December 1931 and end from January 1933 to December 1933, and the second competitive
periods could start from January to December 1938 and similarly end from January to December
1938. As a result, there are 67,392 possible combinations.
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Weiss’ study. In other words, it outlines whether the collusive behaviors were successful
during these periods based on his study.
The second column in Table 8 is the result of the model with the conspiracy
periods of the detection from the ICSS algorithm. The variable of interest in this model,
CONSPIRE, has a positive and significant coefficient with the value of about 0.59. What
this positive coefficient means is that steel producers overcharge up to 5.9% from their
purchasers. The coefficient of the variable, IRP, tells that a $1 increase on the price of pig
iron will increase the steel price by about 3%, given other variables are constant. The
variable, WAGE, has the coefficient with the value of about 0.0042, which means that
given that other variables are constant, a $1 increase in the average weekly wage in the
steel industry will increase the steel price by about 0.4%. The interpretation of the
coefficient for ALUM is that a 1¢ increase in the price of aluminum will result in the price
of steel increasing by about 1%. All the coefficients of these three variables representing
the forces from the supply for the steel are positive and significant as what should be
expected.
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Table 8
Steel Model
Coefficient
[t]

Variable Name

Conspiracy periods
Defined by the ICSS algorithm

Based on the documents[a]

CONSPIRE

0.05852
[4.33]***

0.02339
[1.56]

IRP

0.03027
[15.62]***

0.02519
[14.36]***

WAGE

0.00416
[1.77]*

0.01083
[6.15]***

ALUM

0.00972
[3.45]***

0.01797
[8.38]***

CAR

-0.00002369
[-0.48]

-0.00006753
[-1.32]

RAIL

0.00844
[4.89]***

0.00897
[5.01]***

Y

0.00000793
[0.02]

0.00032218
[0.92]

INTERCEPT

2.50389
[27.20]***

2.26322
[30.75]***

R2

0.8652

0.8542

Adj - R2

0.8604

0.8490

F

179.77

164.00

Note. Dependent variable = LRP
Janurary1923-December 1941
Coefficients are followed by t-statistics in brackets
* = significant at 90%; **=significant at 95%; ***=significant at 99%.
[a] the periods exclude December 1931 to December 1933, and October 1938.
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The variables in this model representing the forces from the demand for the steel
are as follows: CAR, RAIL, and Y. The negative coefficient of CAR states that if the
automobile sector increases its production by one thousands passenger cars, the price of
steel will decrease by 0.002%; however, this value is not statistically significant, which
means that the change of the production of passenger cars had no significant effect on the
price of steel. The interpretation for the coefficient of the variable, RAIL, is if the
manufacturers increase one thousand railway freight cars in the total of their shipment,
the price of steel will rise by 0.8%. This coefficient has an expected positive sign and is
statistically significant. The variable, Y, which captures the rest of the economic activity
which may affect the demand for the steel, has an expected positive coefficient although
not at a significant level. The measurement of “goodness of fit”, R2, Adj-R2, and F-test,
indicates that this model has captured most of the variability in the dependent variable,
the price of steel.
To confirm that the conspiracy period detected by the ICSS algorithm provides a
better model for damage analysis, the model with the conspiracy periods defined by the
literature was used as a comparison. As was discussed in the previous section, there are
many possible outcomes of the model due to the lack of the specific month in those
conspiracy years recorded in the literature. Therefore, the values in the third column in
Table 8 are the results from the most competitive model from all the outcomes. In other
words, in the defined conspiracy period from January 1923 to November 1931, January
1936 to September 1938, and November 1938 to December 1939, the model provides
better result than the model with other possible conspiracy periods based on the literature.
Here a better result is defined by a higher and statistically significant coefficient of
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conspiracy dummy variables, more accurate signs of the rest of the variables, better
measurements of “goodness for fit.” The model with the literature defined conspiracy
period has a positive coefficient of the variable, CONSPIRE, as expected. However, the
value of this coefficient is smaller than the one defined by the ICSS algorithm, and also is
not statistically significant; this value is not statistically different form zero. In other
words, according to the model statistically speaking, the producers did not overcharge for
steel during those conspiracy periods. The sign of the rest of the variables in this model
are as expected except the variable, CAR. This is the same as the model with the ICSS
algorithm defined conspiracy periods. However, its R2, Adj-R2, and F-test are smaller
than the model with the conspiracy periods defined by the ICSS algorithm.
The first antitrust lawsuit in the steel industry was brought by the federal
government in 1911, and the Supreme Court made a decision in favor of the producers.
(US v. United States Steel, 1920) The court concluded that even if the producer had the
intent to behave as a monopolist, it did not abuse its rivals or exploit the public. Since
then, although it was illegal for producers of steel to enter “formal” price-fixing or
marketing agreements, merger and informal price leadership were within the law until
1945. The antitrust lawsuits in the steel industry were not successful because the Court
did not find that the producers’ collusive behaviors substantially lessened competition; in
other words, no damage to the public existed. (US v. Republic Steel Corp.,1935). The
result of the conspiracy periods based on the literature tells the same story as from the
Court. However, using the ICSS algorithm, this study has successfully shown that the
damage did exit in the steel industry in the 1920s and 1930s. The conspiracy periods were
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not those shown in the physical evidence but those periods with the relative lower
variance.
With the estimate of the amount overcharged by the steel producers on the price
of steel, the damage on the purchasers now could be calculated if the quantity of the steel
billets sold was available. Although the quantity of the steel billets sold during the
conspiracy periods was not available, the production of steel ingots could be used to
estimate it and is available in the Survey of Current Business. If on the average, 90% of
the production of steel ingots were sold, the total sales of during the conspiracy period
were the product of the wholesale price for the steel billets, the quantity of the steel ingot
produced, and the percentage assumed to be sold. The estimated sales of steel ingots
during the first successful conspiracy period of August 1924 to November 1931 were
about $9.6 billion. Therefore, the 5.9% overcharge would cause the damage to purchasers
of steel products up to about $567.3 million. Producers’ sales during the other successful
conspiracy period of June 1938 to December 1939 were estimated to be about $1.98
billion. Given the overcharge rate from the producers, the purchasers overpaid on steel
product up to $116.5 million. Hence, the total damage on customers who purchased steel
within these two conspiracy periods is about $683.8 million.
In both empirical studies for the flat glass and steel industries, the conspiracy
periods detected by the ICSS algorithm has successfully found damage by the producers.
By using the damage analysis model in this study, the conspiracy periods defined by
courts or literature in these two cases did not show any statistically significant overcharge
from the producers. However, as was mentioned in previous sections, cheating may have
occurred during collusive periods, and some informal evidence of the existing or
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breakdown of cartel agreements might not be released. As a result, the ICSS algorithm
does provide forensic economists an alternative method in detecting successful cartels.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Most cartels have negative effects on purchasers and participating firms’ potential
competitiors. The Sherman Antitrust Act states that cartel behavior in the United States is
illegal and government agencies should make efforts to detect, prosecute, and penalize
these practices. This paper proposes that the Iterative Cumulative Sums of Squares
(ICSS) Algorithm can be applied to help better detect periods of collusive behavior in
markets by analyzing changes in the variance of product prices over time.
Price rigidity is a common characteristic of oligopolies and has been theoretically
proven in many studies. One well-known explanation of this behavior is the kinkeddemand-curve. The relationship between collusive behavior and kinked demand curves is
based on the assumption that firms do not choose their prices simultaneously and that any
price-cutting behavior by a firm will cause the retaliation of a further price-cutting from
rivals. As a result, price wars would occur, and firms would earn lesser profits. Therefore,
firms would prefer to stay at the agreed upon monopoly price, rather than cutting prices
to earn more market share during one period.
A more recent study by Athey et al. (2004) discussing price rigidity during
collusive periods was developed using an infinitely repeated Bertrand game. This model
suggests the theory that a firm's collusive price is independent of its current cost position
in a rigid-pricing scheme. Moreover, this rigid-pricing scheme sacrifices efficiency
benefits but also diminishes the information costs. By assuming the prices are publicly
observed and the costs are privately observed and independent and identically distributed,
this model proves that if the firms are sufficiently patient the optimal symmetric collusive
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scheme can be reached when equilibrium-path price wars are absent and the price is rigid.
This theorem implies that the variability of firms’ prices over time is smaller under a
collusive regime than a competitive regime.
The other recent study by Harrington and Chen (2006) develops price rigidity in
the collusive period using a dynamic programming framework. This study argues that
any suspicious price change will secure buyers’ attention, and they will begin to
investigate the existence of the cartel; in order to avoid detection, the cartel sets prices to
be more stable over time. In this study, buyers’ suspicion of the existence of a cartel does
not come from their knowledge of what a cartel price should be but from the observation
that the price series is sufficiently anomalous or inexplicable when compared to the
history of prices. In other words, buyers have their ideas about whether price changes are
reasonable based on the history of price changes. Knowing that price patterns affect
buyers’ beliefs and thus can affect the probability of detection, firms inherit the noncollusive price and buyers’ expectance of price changes based on non-collusive periods
when they form a cartel. This dynamic programming system has established an optimal
cartel price path which has a transition phase and a stationary phase. In the transition
phase, under some specific parameter set in this model, the price path is rising,
overshooting, and converging into stationary phases. On the other hand, price in a
collusive regime is much less volatile than price in a competitive regime.
Since price rigidity in collusive periods has been proven in many theoretical
studies, the ICSS algorithm, which detects multiple changes of variance in a given time
series, is applied in this study. This technique was developed by Inclan and Tiao in 1994
and is commonly used in studies of finance. Inclan and Tiao considered series that
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present a stationary behavior for some time, then suddenly the variability of the error
term changes; it stays constant again for some time at this new value, until another
change occurs. They first used cumulative sums of squares to search for change points
systematically at different piece of series and then used an algorithm to find multiple
change points in an iterative way.
To apply the ICSS algorithm in detecting the existence of cartel, two empirical
cases were studied in Chapter 4. The first case is the flat glass antitrust litigation in the
early 1990’s. The flat glass industry was concentrated among five major manufacturers
(PPG, LOF, AFG, Guardian, and Ford). The entry barriers to the flat glass industry were
very high due to high market concentration and high fixed costs of entry to this market.
Flat glass in general is recognized as a commodity product, and thus price is the decisive
factor affecting purchasing decisions. Because of these characteristics, price-fixing by
manufacturers in this industry was more apt to be successful. Agreements between these
five manufacturers have revealed the collusive behavior in the flat glass industry in the
early 1990s.
By using the ICSS algorithm to test the Producer Price Index of flat glass, two
suspected collusive periods, December 1982 to June 1984 and November 1987 to
February 1990, reveal lower variance relative to other periods. In order to confirm
producers’ collusive behavior, the damage analysis is applied to see whether purchasers
of flat glass products were overcharged during those suspected collusive period. After
accounting for other forces from the demand and supply factors of PPI for flat glass, the
positive coefficient of the conspiracy dummy variable relates that producers of flat glass
overcharged flat glass products by over 5%. This percentage of overcharge by producers
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caused the total damage up to about $1.14 billion. On the contrary, by using the class
certified conspiracy period, the coefficient of the conspiracy dummy variable shows that
producers undercharged rather than overcharged their customers. In other words, even
though physical evidence shows that producers in the flat glass industry colluded during
the class certified period, there is no evidence showing that they overcharge on prices of
flat glass in the damage analysis model of this study. In short, during the conspiracy
periods detected by the ICSS algorithm, the manufacturers’ did successfully collude in
overcharging the price of flat glass.
The other empirical study discussed is the steel industry in 1920s to 1930s.
Producers in steel industry had significant ability to collude and agree on set prices
because of the characteristics of the market they operated during that time. At the turning
of the 20th century, the steel industry was concentrated among eight large firms due to
industry consolidation. These eight major steel firms accounted for almost 80% market
share of total steel ingot capacity from the 1920s to the 1950s. Moreover, since most steel
is used as an ingredient of other products, and there are not many good substitutes of steel,
the demand curves that the steel producers faced were relatively inelastic. The
concentration and the inelastic demand of the steel industry allow firms in this industry to
have significant market power if they were to act in concert to increase prices.
The suspected collusive periods detected by the ICSS algorithm in the steel
industry were the periods of August 1924 to November 1931 and June 1938 to December
1939. Similarly, whether steel producers did overcharge steel prices during these
collusion periods, or whether steel producers’ collusive behaviors were successful,
damage analysis was employed to confirm it. The coefficient of the conspiracy variable is
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about 0.059 and is significant at 99% level, which states that the producers of steel did
overcharge steel by about 5.9% during the successful conspiracy periods. The conspiracy
periods based on the literature, in contrast, demonstrate that there is no significant
overcharge from the producers in the damage analysis model of this study. The total
damage on the purchasers during these conspiracy periods is up to $683.8 million.
Based on empirical results, the ICSS algorithm provides a fast and simple method
of detecting the existence of cartels and collusive behavior. This is the first study to apply
the ICSS algorithm in forensic economics to detection of this behavior and appears to be
successful in detecting periods of anticompetitive behavior. This study is just like most
medical experiments in labs; many limitations occur during the entire experiment
process. For example, most of the time instead of testing humans, new medication only
could test on rats. Whether what works on rats will work on humans will not be
discovered until the reaction from humans is proven, and that reaction may differ due to
different individual physique. Similar, the ICSS algorithm has successfully detected the
collusive periods in two empirical studies. In the future, this methodology will be
expected to be examined in the antitrust litigation cases with more specific data.
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Appendix
To project the missing value of variable of glass sand prior to June 1982 in the
model for flat glass study, an explanatoy model is constructed. Glass sand (Silica sand) is
the most common ingredient in glass. It makes up about 60 to 70 % of the glass batch.
Hence the production of a glass product is the major factor for demand of glass sand. The
varaible used here to present this demand factor is total inventory in millions of dollars in
the industry of stone, clay, and glass. The data of this total inventory were obtained from
U.S. Census.
The main factor for the cost of producing glass sand is fuel. All glass sand in
North America is dried at the silica processing plant before being shipped to the glass
manufacturing plant. Drying is the most expensive unit operation in processing glass sand,
and most sulica sand is dried using a fluidized bed dryer. The energy source for fluid bed
dryers is fuel. The variable used to represent the cost of fuel is the PPI for light fuel oils.
The other energy cost for glass sand is electricity. For example, the machine in magnetic
separation of processing glass sand is operated by electricity. The PPI for industrial
electric power is used as the variable of electricity. Both PPI for light fuel oils and
industrial electric power were obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics. In short, the
model in predicting the PPI for glass sand is:
3.56706 0.00001676
[127.93]*** [2.86]***

R2 = 0.9482
where

0.00027911
[2.26]**

Adj R2 = 0.9473 F-test = 1042.85
= the predict log value of PPI for glass sand.
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0.00885
[23.18]***

